Pic Concept of Reduction

  • R. van Riel: The Concept of Reduction, Philosophical Studies Series, Springer 2014.
  • R. van Riel & G. Vosgerau: Grundlagen der Logik: Aussagen- und Prädikatenlogik. Metzler, 2018.

Edited Volumes


  • A.-M. Eder, I. Lawler, R. van Riel (eds.): Philosophical Methods. Special Issue: Synthese (in preparation).
  • M. Eronen, R. van Riel: Understanding Through Modeling. Special Issue: Synthese 2015.
  • R. van Riel, E. Di Nucci, J. Schildmann (eds.): Enhancement der Moral, Mentis 2015.
  • R. van Riel: The Concept of Reduction, Philosophical Studies Series, Springer 2014.
  • R. van Riel, A. Newen: Reductionism in the Philosophy of Mind Special Issue: Philosophia Naturalis, 2010/2011.
  • A. Newen, R. van Riel, Identity, Language and Mind. Introduction to the Philosophy of John Perry CSLI Publishing/Mentis 2012.

Work published by members of the project


Forthcoming/Accepted for Publication:

  • Eder, Lawler, van Riel: Philosophical methods under scrutiny. Introduction to the special issue Philosophical methodsSynthese. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-018-02051-2
  • van Riel: Lying beyond a conversational purpose. A critqique of Stokke’s assertion based account of lying. The Journal of Philosophy
  • van Riel: Reduktion und reduktive Erklärungen. in: V. Hoffmann-Kolss, Handbuch Metaphysik, Metzler (solicited)
  • van Riel & van Gulick: “Scientific Reduction”, in: The Stanford Encyclopedia (revised version of the first version published in 2014)
  • Lawler: Understanding, explanation, and intelligibility. A review of Henk de Regt’s “Understanding Scientific Understanding”. Metascience. DOI: 10.1007/s11016-018-0358-3
  • Lawler: Levels of reasons why and answers to why-questions. Philosophy of Science.
  • Lawler: Understanding why, knowing why, and cognitive achievements. Synthese. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-017‑1672-9
  • van Riel: Reduktion und Emergenz. in: Schrenk, M. (Ed.) Handbuch Metaphysik (in German).
  • van Riel: Leibniz on Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Necessity without Dependence. Studia Leibnitiana.


  • Heiner Koch, Raphael van Riel: “Gewalt – definitorische und normative Aspekte”. Sozialpsychiatrische Informationen 2019, I, 4-8.


  • Lawler: Begriffsanalyse. in: Wörterbücher zur Sprach- und  Kommunikationswissenschaft (in German).


  • van Riel: Falsche Fragen, Verstehenslücken und philosophische Analysen. (“Wrong Questions, Gaps in Understanding, and Philosophical Analysis” – online publication of a talk delivered in Gießen in 2016) – Information Philosophie (online), 4.2017 Link.
  • van Riel: ‘Free Will, Foreknowledge, and Future-Dependent Beliefs’, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 55, 2017, 500-520


  • van Riel: Mental Disorder and the Indirect Construction of Social Facts. Journal of Social Ontology. DOI: 10.1515/jso-2016-0008.
  • van Riel: What is the Problem of Explanation and Modeling? Acta Analytica.
  • van Riel: Real Knowledge-Undermining Luck. Logos and Episteme 7(3).
  • Lawler: Reductionism about understanding why. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 229-236, DOI:  10.1093/arisoc/aow007
  • van Riel: If you understand, you won’t be lucky. Grazer Philosophische Studien 93, 196-211.
  • Lawler: Review of Dirk Koppelberg and Stefan Tolksdorf’s (eds.): Erkenntnistheorie – Wie und Wozu? Journal for General Philosophy of Science, DOI:  10.1007/s10838-016-9349-5.
  • van Riel: What is Constructionism in Psychiatry? From Social Causes to Psychiatric Explanation. Frontiers in Psychiatry, DOI:  10.3389/fpsyt.2016.00057.
  • van Riel: Enhancing Beyond What Ought to Be the Case. A Conceptual Clarification. Bioethics . DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12241.


  • van Riel: Review of Jason Stanley’s ‘How Propaganda Works’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, DOI: 10.1007/s10677-015-9667-4
  • van Riel: ‘Modelle und Interpretationen – Grenzen eines allgemeinen Modellbegriffs’, (in German: ‘Models and Interpretations – On the limits of a unified concept of a model’. Comment on Bernd Mahr’s ‘Modelle und ihre Befragbarkeit. Grundlagen eines allgemeinen Modellbegriffs’) Erwägen, Wissen, Ethik.
  • Eder: ‘No Match Point for the Permissibility Account’, Erkenntnis, DOI 10.1007/s10670-014-9709-7
  • van Riel: The Content of Model-Based Information. Or: Why Modal Knowledge Does not Matter for Scientific Modeling, Synthese, online first: DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-0728-y.


  • Reuter, Kirfel, van Riel, Barlassina: The Good, the Bad, and the Timely: How Temporal Order and Moral Judgment Influence Causal Selection. Frontiers in Psychology
  • Eder (with P. Brössel): ‘How to Resolve Doxastic Disagreement’, Synthese, 191, 2350-81.
  • van Riel: ‘McDowells Frege (und Evans)’, in: Lauer, D. and Barth, Ch. (eds). Die Philosophie John McDowells, Paderborn: Mentis, 203-222.
  • van Riel , Van Gulick: ‘Scientific Reduction’, [+] in: Zalta, E.N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • van Riel : The Nature of Types and Tokens: On the Metaphysical Commitments of Non-Reductive Physicalism, Metaphysica. DOI: 10.1515/mp-2014-0014
  • van Riel:  Prophets Against Ockhamism. Why the Hard Fact/Soft Fact Distinction is Irrelevant to the Problem of Foreknowledge. International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, 75 (2), 119-135. Doi: 10.1007/s11153-013-9430-5 (online first: 2013)


  • Eder (with P. Brössel and F. Huber): ‘Evidential Support and Instrumental Rationality’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87: 279-300.
    Eder (with P. Brössel): ‘Wahrscheinlichkeit und Erkenntnis’, in: E. Bonk (ed.) Lexikon der Erkenntnistheorie. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
  • van Riel: Michael Weisberg: Simulation and Similarity. Using Models to Understand the World (Review) Zeitschrift für Philosophische Literatur, 1, 60-70.


  • van Riel: ‘Identity, Asymmetry, and the Relevance of Meanings for Models of Reduction’,
    The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Doi: 10.1093/bjps/axs028.
  • van Riel: ‘Pains, Pills, and Properties – Functionalism and the First-Order/Second-Order Distinction’, Dialectica 66, 543-562.
  • van Riel: ‘Personal Identity’, in: Newen, van Riel (eds.). Identity, Language, and Mind. An Introduction to the Philosophy of John Perry. Stanford/Paderborn: CSLIPubl./Mentis.


  • van Riel: ‘Cognitive Significance and Epistemic Intensions’, Logique et Analyse, 54/216, 2011.
  • van Riel: ‘Nagelian Reduction Beyond the Nagel-Model’, Philosophy of Science 78/3, 2011, 353-375.
  • van Riel: ‘Identity-based reduction and Reductive Explanation’, Philosophia Naturalis, 47-48 (1-2), 2010-2011, 183-219.